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Device identity and secure provisioning

A device identity is a key pair generated inside the device and bound to it, which the device uses to prove what it is. Its strength is fixed at the moment of generation: entropy available at first provisioning determines whether the identity is unique and unpredictable for the device's entire life.

Why generated rather than injected

Two approaches exist. Inject a key at manufacture, or have the device generate its own. Injection means the manufacturer knows the key, needs a secure facility, and creates a database whose compromise affects every device made.

Generation avoids all of that — the private key never exists outside the device. It exchanges those problems for one: the device must be able to generate an unpredictable key on its own, at a moment when it has no history, no user and often no network.

The worst moment to need randomness

First boot on a factory line is the least entropic moment in a device's life. No accumulated interrupt timing, no disk activity, no user input, and every unit on the line is in nearly the same state at nearly the same time.

That is exactly the condition behind the internet-scale surveys that found devices sharing RSA factors. Not a bug in anyone's cryptography — devices in identical states producing overlapping key material.

Provisioning, properly

  • Generate inside the security boundary, so the private key never exists elsewhere.
  • Draw from a hardware entropy source rather than accumulated system state, because at first boot there is no state.
  • Block until the source is producing, rather than proceeding with whatever is available. A slower line is cheaper than a recalled product.
  • Record what the entropy source's health was at generation — the beginning of provenance for the identity.
  • Have the device present a certificate signing request rather than accepting a key from outside.

Why it is unrecoverable

A device identity is typically fused or written once, and the device lives for years — a decade or more for meters, vehicles and industrial equipment. It cannot be rotated by a firmware update, because the update is authenticated using the identity.

Every other cryptographic decision in the device can be revisited. This one is made once, at the moment when entropy is hardest to come by, and it is why an entropy source that works at first boot is worth designing in rather than assuming.