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HSM, TPM and secure element compared

An HSM is a high-performance appliance for key operations at scale. A TPM is a low-cost fixed-function chip for platform integrity and attestation. A secure element is an embedded tamper-resistant chip holding a device's identity. They differ in throughput, cost, physical protection and what they are meant to protect.

At a glance

  • HSM — a card or appliance. High throughput, strong tamper response, expensive, evaluated under FIPS 140-3 or Common Criteria. Protects keys used at volume: certificate authorities, payments, code signing.
  • TPM — a standardised low-cost chip on a platform. Modest performance, fixed function, designed for measured boot, attestation and sealing. Protects platform integrity rather than throughput.
  • Secure element — an embedded tamper-resistant chip, often in a phone, a meter or a vehicle. Small, cheap in volume, physically hardened. Protects one device's identity and a handful of keys.

HSM against TPM

Different problems entirely. An HSM answers "sign a great many things quickly, and never let the key out". A TPM answers "tell me what this machine booted, and seal this secret to that state".

A TPM cannot serve a certificate authority — the throughput is not there and it is not what it is for. An HSM cannot do measured boot, because it is not part of the platform's boot chain.

TPM against secure element

Closer in capability and different in purpose. A TPM follows a standard specification and is oriented to platform state. A secure element is usually application-specific, more physically hardened, and oriented to device identity.

A phone has a secure element for its identity and payment credentials; a laptop has a TPM for platform attestation. Some designs use one part for both, which is where the vocabulary gets muddled.

HSM against secure element

Scale. An HSM protects keys that many systems depend on; a secure element protects one device's keys. The engineering trades follow: an HSM can spend power and area on tamper response, and a secure element in a meter has almost none of either.

What they share

All three generate keys internally, and all three therefore depend on an entropy source inside their boundary. The evaluation scope of each may or may not cover that source, and it is the question people forget to ask — where the entropy in a certified module actually comes from.