Skip to content
Briefing material

High-assurance deployment

Entropy in environments where the trust boundary cannot depend on a network: space, defence, government and QKD systems, and the regulated infrastructure that follows them.

What it covers

  • Why randomness delivered over a network cannot be verified where it is used
  • Sovereignty, availability and audit as architectural properties, not policies
  • Qualification evidence for constrained and long-lifecycle environments
  • Mapping the properties of an entropy architecture onto NIST and BSI requirements

Request the material on high-assurance deployment

Tell us where to send it and a little about what you are building.

An engineer replies, not an autoresponder. Say what you are building and the answer covers your case as well as the general one.

← All subjects

Why this is being asked now

The entropy source used to be an implementation detail. Four changes in the standards and regulatory record moved it into the certification path.

Aug 2024

FIPS 203, 204 and 205 finalised

A key-encapsulation mechanism and two signature schemes, standardised. Post-quantum moved from selection into deployment.

Sep 2025

SP 800-90C became final

The construction standard connecting a validated entropy source to an approved deterministic mechanism — making the relationship between the two explicit.

2024–25

BSI updated AIS 20/31

Physical, hybrid and deterministic RNG evaluation stayed central to Common Criteria work, with new transition guidance.

From 2027

ANSSI expects PQC in qualification

French guidance states post-quantum considerations should enter product qualification from 2027. It is a strong procurement signal, not a legal ban.

Ask for the material.

Tell us who has to be convinced — an assessor, an architecture board, a programme team — and the answer is written for them.

Request the material