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Secure boot and measured boot explained

Secure boot enforces: each stage verifies the next against a trusted key and refuses to run anything that fails. Measured boot records: each stage hashes the next into a tamper-evident register so a remote party can see what ran. They answer different questions and are frequently confused.

Secure boot enforces

The root of trust verifies the first mutable stage against a key fused at manufacture. That stage verifies the next, and so on. A signature that fails to verify stops the boot.

The property gained is that only code signed by the holder of the signing key runs. The property not gained is any statement about whether that code is correct.

Measured boot records

Each stage hashes the next and extends that hash into a register that can be appended to but never rewritten — a PCR in TPM terms. The boot proceeds regardless of what the measurements are.

At the end, the register values are a fingerprint of exactly what ran. A remote party can ask for them, signed, and decide whether to trust the device. Measured boot does not prevent anything; it makes what happened undeniable.

Why both exist

  • Secure boot alone stops unsigned code, and cannot tell you which signed version booted — including an older signed image with a known vulnerability.
  • Measured boot alone tells you precisely what ran, after it has already run.
  • Together they stop unsigned code and produce evidence of which signed code ran, which is what remote attestation actually needs.

Where the practical difficulty is

Not the mechanism, but key management and revocation. If a signing key is compromised, every device trusting it needs updating, and the update has to be signed by something. If an older signed image is vulnerable, secure boot happily runs it unless anti-rollback counters are in place.

Anti-rollback is where many implementations are thin, and it is a question worth asking of any device claiming secure boot.

The entropy connection

Attestation requires the device to sign its measurements with a device-unique key. That key was generated at some point, from some source, usually at first provisioning. If it was predictable, the attestation is forgeable and the entire chain reports on a device an attacker can impersonate — which is the provisioning problem.