Post-quantum cryptography: from algorithms to infrastructure
Post-quantum cryptography replaces the public-key algorithms a large quantum computer would break with ones believed resistant to it. The standards are published and the mathematics is the easy part; the difficult part is finding every place cryptography is used and changing the hardware it runs on.
31 articles in 6 sections
The migration is an infrastructure programme wearing a mathematics costume. The algorithms are specified, implemented and available. What remains is inventory, replacement and the fact that a great deal of cryptography is executed by hardware with a ten-year life.
What is actually at risk
Not everything, and the distinction matters. Public-key algorithms — RSA and elliptic curve — are the ones a sufficiently large quantum computer would break. Symmetric ciphers and hash functions are weakened rather than broken, and are addressed by using larger parameters. The measured version of that assessment is the starting point.
The standards exist
NIST finalised the first three post-quantum standards in August 2024: FIPS 203 for key encapsulation, FIPS 204 and FIPS 205 for signatures. What each covers is the reference page; national schemes then add their own guidance on top, and they do not agree in every detail.
Why this pillar cares about hardware
Because the migration is not a software update for the parts that matter most. HSMs, network appliances, secure elements and embedded devices execute cryptography in hardware, and they get replaced on a refresh cycle rather than a release cycle.
Every appliance in an estate will be opened before 2030. Something goes into the slot while it is open, and what goes in has to survive the standards changing again — which is the agility argument.
The dependency this category forgets
New algorithms consume randomness exactly as the old ones did. A post-quantum key generated from a weak entropy source is a weak key, and the algorithm change does nothing about it. Why that dependency survives the migration.
Fundamentals
What a quantum computer would actually break, what it would only weaken, and how seriously to take harvest-now-decrypt-later.
Harvest now, decrypt later, a realistic threat assessment
Harvest now, decrypt later is the strategy of recording encrypted traffic today to decrypt once a quantum computer exists. It is a real concern for data with a long confidentiality requirement and an adversary capable of bulk interception, and it is routinely overstated for data that is worthless in a decade.
Why quantum computing threatens today's cryptography
A sufficiently large, error-corrected quantum computer running Shor's algorithm would break RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography. Symmetric ciphers and hash functions are weakened rather than broken, and are addressed by increasing parameter sizes. No such machine exists today, and the migration is urgent for reasons of timescale rather than imminence.
The Quantum Threat Is Real: Here’s What Security Leaders Need to Know
Quside develops new-generation quantum technologies for secure connectivity and efficient computation.
Why We Need Quantum-Proof Encryption: Explained Simply
Quside develops new-generation quantum technologies for secure connectivity and efficient computation.
What Is Quantum Technology: Explained Simply
Quside develops new-generation quantum technologies for secure connectivity and efficient computation.
Exploring the Future of Security with the Second Quantum Revolution
Quside develops new-generation quantum technologies for secure connectivity and efficient computation.
Quantum Computer and Cryptography
Quside develops new-generation quantum technologies for secure connectivity and efficient computation.
What is the quantum threat, and what can you do about it?
Discover how to protect against the quantum threats and attacks. Learn about quantum-safe solutions and how to prepare for the future.
What is quantum technology?
We dive into quantum technology and its transformative impact across diverse industries. Find out more about revolutionary principles of this field!
Quantum technology: why should you integrate it today
Quside develops new-generation quantum technologies for secure connectivity and efficient computation.
Algorithms and standards
FIPS 203, 204 and 205 — what ML-KEM and ML-DSA do, and why almost everyone is deploying them alongside classical algorithms.
FIPS 203, 204 and 205, what each standard actually covers
NIST finalised three post-quantum standards in August 2024. FIPS 203 specifies ML-KEM for key encapsulation, FIPS 204 specifies ML-DSA for signatures, and FIPS 205 specifies SLH-DSA as a hash-based signature alternative with different assumptions.
Hybrid cryptography explained, classical and post-quantum side by side
A hybrid construction combines a classical algorithm with a post-quantum one so that the result is secure if either holds. X25519MLKEM768 is the common form in TLS today. It exists because post-quantum algorithms are new, and it costs bandwidth rather than confidence.
ML-DSA and SLH-DSA explained
ML-DSA is the general-purpose post-quantum signature scheme, based on lattice assumptions and suitable for most signing. SLH-DSA is a hash-based alternative with larger, slower signatures whose security depends only on hash functions — a deliberate hedge against advances in lattice cryptanalysis.
ML-KEM explained
ML-KEM is a key encapsulation mechanism: instead of two parties agreeing a shared secret by exchanging public values, one party encapsulates a fresh secret under the other's public key and sends the ciphertext. Its security rests on the hardness of the Module Learning With Errors problem.
Post Quantum Cryptography algorithms explained
Quside develops new-generation quantum technologies for secure connectivity and efficient computation.
Quantum Resistant Cryptography
Quside develops new-generation quantum technologies for secure connectivity and efficient computation.
Quantum Security in Orbit: The Rise of Satellite-Based Quantum Key Distribution
Quside develops new-generation quantum technologies for secure connectivity and efficient computation.
What is Quantum cryptography?
Quside develops new-generation quantum technologies for secure connectivity and efficient computation.
How does Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) work?
Learn how Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) secures communication through quantum physics, ensuring encryption and preventing eavesdropping.
Planning the migration
What NIST, CNSA, ANSSI and BSI have each said, how to find every place cryptography is used, and what has to change inside the hardware.
Cryptographic inventory, the first step nobody wants to take
A cryptographic inventory records every place cryptography is used: algorithms, key sizes, certificate lifetimes, libraries, protocol versions and the hardware that executes them. It is the first migration step, the least popular, and the one that determines whether the rest of the programme is planned or discovered.
PQC for HSM, PKI and appliance vendors, an OEM roadmap
For HSM, PKI and appliance vendors the post-quantum migration is a product requirement arriving on a customer's procurement schedule. What has to change inside the box is algorithm support, larger key and signature handling, higher entropy consumption, and the ability to change again when the standards move.
PQC migration timelines, NIST, ANSSI, BSI and CNSA 2.0 compared
NIST published the first post-quantum standards in August 2024 and has proposed deprecating current public-key algorithms around 2030 and disallowing them around 2035. CNSA 2.0, ANSSI and BSI each set their own expectations, and they do not align — the applicable one depends on your sector and jurisdiction.
5 easy things you can do to get your quantum-safe journey started
Quside develops new-generation quantum technologies for secure connectivity and efficient computation.
Crypto agility
Why the algorithms will change again after this migration, and what that means for hardware bought now.
Crypto agility in hardware, why programmable beats fixed silicon
If cryptographic algorithms are committed to fixed silicon, every standards revision becomes a board respin and a new qualification cycle. In programmable hardware the same revision is a firmware update to a card that is already deployed and already qualified.
The performance cost of PQC, bigger keys, longer handshakes, more entropy
Post-quantum algorithms cost bandwidth and memory more than CPU. Keys and signatures are substantially larger, handshakes carry more data, hybrid modes perform both exchanges, and entropy consumption rises per transaction. Measure your own workload rather than trusting a benchmark table.
What is crypto agility, and why it matters now
Crypto agility is the ability to change cryptographic algorithms without redesigning the system that uses them. It matters now because post-quantum standards are settling rather than settled: parameter sets are revised, national schemes diverge, and a scheme could be weakened by cryptanalysis.
Post-quantum and entropy
Why new algorithms still depend on a strong entropy source, and why a quantum random number generator does not make a system quantum-safe.
PQC does not replace QRNG, and QRNG does not make you quantum-safe
Two errors, in opposite directions. Post-quantum algorithms do not remove the need for a good entropy source, and a quantum random number generator does not make a system quantum-safe. They address different problems and neither substitutes for the other.
Why PQC algorithms need strong entropy, the key generation dependency
Post-quantum algorithms consume randomness exactly as their predecessors did. ML-KEM samples a fresh secret per encapsulation and ML-DSA in hedged mode consumes randomness per signature — so a post-quantum key generated from a weak entropy source is a weak key, and changing the algorithm does nothing about it.
Embracing Level 4 RNGs for Robust Post-Quantum Cryptography: Key Insights for 2025
Quside develops new-generation quantum technologies for secure connectivity and efficient computation.
Perspective
Arguments rather than explainers.
From crypto agility to hardware agility
The industry accepted years ago that software must be able to change its cryptography. The same argument applies with more force to hardware, which changes on a decade-long refresh cycle rather than a release cycle — and where the inability to change is decided at design time by someone else.
Why the future HSM will need more than algorithms
A post-quantum HSM will be judged on three things beyond its algorithm list: what evidence it can produce about its entropy source, whether its cryptographic implementation can change after it ships, and whether it has the execution capacity for operations that cost more than the ones they replace.