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Post-quantum cryptography: from algorithms to infrastructure

Post-quantum cryptography replaces the public-key algorithms a large quantum computer would break with ones believed resistant to it. The standards are published and the mathematics is the easy part; the difficult part is finding every place cryptography is used and changing the hardware it runs on.

31 articles in 6 sections

The migration is an infrastructure programme wearing a mathematics costume. The algorithms are specified, implemented and available. What remains is inventory, replacement and the fact that a great deal of cryptography is executed by hardware with a ten-year life.

What is actually at risk

Not everything, and the distinction matters. Public-key algorithms — RSA and elliptic curve — are the ones a sufficiently large quantum computer would break. Symmetric ciphers and hash functions are weakened rather than broken, and are addressed by using larger parameters. The measured version of that assessment is the starting point.

The standards exist

NIST finalised the first three post-quantum standards in August 2024: FIPS 203 for key encapsulation, FIPS 204 and FIPS 205 for signatures. What each covers is the reference page; national schemes then add their own guidance on top, and they do not agree in every detail.

Why this pillar cares about hardware

Because the migration is not a software update for the parts that matter most. HSMs, network appliances, secure elements and embedded devices execute cryptography in hardware, and they get replaced on a refresh cycle rather than a release cycle.

Every appliance in an estate will be opened before 2030. Something goes into the slot while it is open, and what goes in has to survive the standards changing again — which is the agility argument.

The dependency this category forgets

New algorithms consume randomness exactly as the old ones did. A post-quantum key generated from a weak entropy source is a weak key, and the algorithm change does nothing about it. Why that dependency survives the migration.

Fundamentals

What a quantum computer would actually break, what it would only weaken, and how seriously to take harvest-now-decrypt-later.

Algorithms and standards

FIPS 203, 204 and 205 — what ML-KEM and ML-DSA do, and why almost everyone is deploying them alongside classical algorithms.

Planning the migration

What NIST, CNSA, ANSSI and BSI have each said, how to find every place cryptography is used, and what has to change inside the hardware.

Crypto agility

Why the algorithms will change again after this migration, and what that means for hardware bought now.

Post-quantum and entropy

Why new algorithms still depend on a strong entropy source, and why a quantum random number generator does not make a system quantum-safe.

Perspective

Arguments rather than explainers.