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Why PQC algorithms need strong entropy, the key generation dependency

Post-quantum algorithms consume randomness exactly as their predecessors did. ML-KEM samples a fresh secret per encapsulation and ML-DSA in hedged mode consumes randomness per signature — so a post-quantum key generated from a weak entropy source is a weak key, and changing the algorithm does nothing about it.

Two parts of the same architecture, and only one of them is being migrated. The algorithm is the machine; the entropy is the material it works on.

Where each algorithm consumes randomness

  • ML-KEM key generation — sampling the secret and error terms that define the private key.
  • ML-KEM encapsulation — a fresh secret per session, chosen by the sender. Predictable here means the session is compromised even though ML-KEM is sound.
  • ML-DSA key generation — the same requirement as any key.
  • ML-DSA hedged signing — fresh randomness per signature, which makes entropy a continuous rather than occasional consumer.
  • SLH-DSA key generation — hash-based, and still dependent on unpredictable seed material.

Why this is not a new problem

It is exactly the dependency RSA and elliptic curve always had. An RSA key from a weak source was weak; an ECDSA nonce from a weak source exposed the private key outright. Nothing about lattices changes the shape of that.

What has changed is attention. A migration is under way, budgets exist, and every system in scope is being examined — and the examination is almost entirely about which algorithm to use, not about what feeds it.

The argument, stated carefully

A post-quantum algorithm protects against an adversary with a quantum computer. It does not protect against an adversary who can predict the numbers you generated. These are different threats and mitigating one does nothing for the other.

An organisation that completes a full post-quantum migration on infrastructure with an unevidenced entropy source has changed which mathematical problem an attacker would have to solve, and left untouched the possibility that they do not need to solve one.

Why it gets worse during migration

Entropy demand rises. Hybrid modes perform two key exchanges. Hedged signing consumes per signature. Re-keying an estate generates far more keys in a period than steady-state operation ever does.

So the migration is simultaneously the moment entropy demand peaks and the moment nobody is looking at entropy. The budget calculation belongs in the migration plan.

What to do about it

Include the entropy source in the cryptographic inventory. Ask the questions in verifying a source you did not build of every device being re-keyed. Do it while the lid is off, because the next time these systems are opened is another refresh cycle away.